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Technological progress makes possible, and economically feasible, a variety of business innovations which can overcome the
obstacles to intemational trade and investment imposed by most
countries. These barriers take many forms, ranging from tariffs
to quotas on trade to restrictions on foreign ownership of
domestic business - but the global enterprise increasingly
leams how to overcome them, albeit at a price.

Responding to Trade Barriers
For a variety of political reasons - mainly to "protect" home
industry owners, managers, and employees, but sometimes on
ostensibly national security grounds - govemments often erect
barriers to intemational commerce. The most notable are tariffs,
quotas, domestic content restrictions, and reciprocity rules. In a
1991 survey, 45 percent of U.S. frrms reported that trade barriers
imposed by other countries presented the greatest impediment to
selling abroad. I
Exporters can absorb the added costs imposed by govemments - at least to some extent. In the case of quotas imposed
by the importing nations, companies frequently shift to higherpriced items on which unit profits are also greater. This was the
response of Korean and Taiwanese shoe producers in the late
1970s to numerical limits on the imports into the United States
of shoes from those two countries.2
In the early 1980s, American purchasers of Japanese-made
automobiles often found that they were required to buy all sorts
of high-priced extras and that they were paying as much as
$2,000 above the sticker price for the reduced supply of Toyotas,
Nissans, and other Japanese automobiles. In that way, the
Japanese producers actually benefitted from the "voluntary" restrictions on their exports to the United States. They increased
their profits substantially in the face of quantitative limits on
their exports of cars to the United States. While the Japanese
producers exported about 30 percent of their auto production to
the United States during that period, they eamed approximately
one-half of their profits from sales in the United States.s
Murray Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of
American Business at Washington University in St. Louis. Harvey S.
James, Jr. is the John M. Olin Fellow at the Center. This research was
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When faced with more onerous obstacles to international
trade, businesses draw on a variety of alternatives to direct exporting. They set up new manufacturing facilities (so-called
greenfield operations) in the host nation. John Deere was one of
many companies to establish production facilities in Europe in
the 1950s in order to avoid the 18 percent tariff enacted following the formation of the European Common Market. 4
This type of response continues today. In 1991, Monsanto's
low-calorie sweetener NutraSweet was hit with a very high duty
in response to a charge of dumping in the European Community
(EC). In 1992, the company entered into a joint venture with
Ajinomoto, a Japanese food and pharmaceutical company, to
build a plant in France to produce for the European market. One
senior NutraSweet official described the situation very directly:
Although there may be evidence to the contrary,
our experience only tells me that you have to be in
Europe if you want to do business in Europe ...
You can't sit offshore somewhere and ship your
product in.5
Many Japanese manufacturers moved the production of such
products as textiles, watches, televisions, cameras and calculators to facilities in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, and
the Philippines in response to the restrictive trade practices of
some of their major markets. 6 Japanese automakers are also
producing automobiles in the United States on a large scale.
This approach provides the Japanese fliiils direct access to the
markets of the local economies in which they produce and minimizes their exposure to adverse policies by the host government. It also permits the Japanese companies to export to markets in other nations that maintain barriers against products
made in their home territory. For instance, Honda sells cars to
Taiwan, South Korea, and Israel from its manufacturing plant in
Ohio. Those three countries have traditionally prohibited the
importation of automobiles directly from Japan. 7
Similarly, Northern Telecom, a Canadian telecommunications
company, conducts business with Japan through its U.S. subsidiaries, since Japanese fliiils are considered to favor U.S. over
Canadian telecommunications companies. This point was made
directly by a Northern Telecom official, "The reality is that we
probably could not have penetrated Japan out of Canada. "8
Firms also respond by acquiring existing local companies.
This has been a particularly important strategy for foreign busi2

nesses positioning themselves in response to the integration of
the European market. Many American and Japanese companies
fear that the removal of internal regulatory and economic barriers in Europe will result in an increase in reciprocity requirements and local content restrictions. Thus, acquisitions increased steadily during the mid- to late-1980s as fliiils sought to
gain a foothold there.9
Examples in 1990 include Emerson Electric's purchase of the
French fliiil Leroy-Somer, General Electric's acquisition of the
United Kingdom's Burton Group Financial Services, American
Brands' buyout of Scotland's Whyte & Mackay Distillers Ltd.,
and Scott Paper's purchase ofTungram Company ofGermany.1o
Other alternatives that business fliiils frequently rely upon to
develop positions in the markets of other nations include subcontracting production, purchasing locally, and developing
products jointly with local fliiils.
To overcome political objections to goods produced by workers in other countries, some multinational corporations set up socalled "screwdriver" operations - assembly plants using key
components manufactured in the home country and performing
no R&D locally. Thus, the economic contribution in the host
country is minimized. Japanese companies are especially guilty
of using this technique. One analyst has used the term
"rainbow" to describe this tendency of large Japanese fliiils,
"The U.S. plant is situated here, the mother plant is situated
over in Japan and nothing touches in between ... and the pot of
gold is at the other end." 11
In a more overt move to reduce opposition to foreign fliiils
"taking away American jobs," Toyota announced in mid-1992 its
plans to start buying parts from a U.S. competitor, Chrysler.
Toyota will buy charcoal-containing canisters (used in emissioncontrol systems) for its Georgetown, Kentucky, factory which
produces the Camry. It also expects to export some of the canisters to Japan to use in its cars made there. In a less publicized
manner, Chrysler has been producing parts for Mitsubishi for
many years. Ford and General Motors are also among Toyota's
North American suppliers.12
Although the principal explanation for onshore production by
Japanese producers is as a response to U.S. protectionism, many
U.S. observers believe that such investments are also a hedge
against even more stringent measures and may even head them
off.1S
Moreover, joint ventures, particularly those involving the operation of manufacturing facilities, are often necessary to over3

come trade restrictions, especially in the case of the formation of
protectionist trade blocs. This trend is evident in the aerospace
and automobile industries, where every major company has
formed alliances with foreign competitors. For instance, Ford
Motor Company has formed a joint venture with a local producer
in Taiwan to assemble Festivas for sale in that market. An alliance involving Ford, Mazda, and Matsushita Electric of Japan
manufactures air-conditioners for Fords and Mazdas sold in
Japan. General Motors markets some of its automobiles in
Japan through a three-way joint venture involving Suzuki and
Nissho Iwai Corporation.l4
Yet, while joint ventures and other cooperative strategies are
often considered as "second-best" relative to exporting or the operation of a wholly owned facility, they do provide important
benefits. These include, in addition to market entry, the advantage of working with a partner knowledgeable about the local
market. as well as the sharing of production costs and risks.
In some circumstances, firms may be able to export duty-free
to countries possessing broad tariff policies in exchange for capital investments or for using local contractors or raw materials in
the production process.l5 A joint venture between General
Motors and a state-owned automobile maker in Poland to manufacture cars domestically will provide a significant inflow of capital, technology, and expertise to the beleaguered Polish carmaker. In return, General Motors will be allowed to import into
Poland a portion of its automobiles duty-free.l6

Responding to Investment Barriers
On other occasions, fum.s face sharp limits to foreign ownership of local enterprises. This type of governmentally imposed
barrier has become more popular in a period when formal trade
barriers have been reduced substantially. Investment barriers
may include formal restrictions on investment, or less formal but
often equally powerful tax and regulatory advantages limited to
local companies.
Even though mergers and acquisitions are the dominant
modes of penetrating European markets, there exists considerable opposition to American takeovers of very large local fum.s,
especially among the member countries of the European
Community. To date, there have been few acquisitions by U.S.
companies in Europe that amounted to over $1 billion.17
4

In Indonesia, no foreign company can buy a local fum. or set
up a new one (except in a very few designated areas). As aresult, as elsewhere in the Asian rim, international enterprises
most often enter into joint ventures with local fum.s or, in extreme cases, literally give away nominal majority ownership.
For these reasons, in Asia and in Eastern Europe, joint ventures
and other strategic alliances are the dominant modes used by
foreign companies attempting to develop a presence in local
markets (see Figure 1). This is particularly true in the case of
high-technology industries (see Appendix).
There exists considerable opposition to
American takeovers of very large local firms,
especially among the member countries
of the European Community.
In the case of defense production, many of the cross-border alliances may at their heart be involuntary on the part of the foreign partner. In large measure, producers of advanced weapon
systems enter into agreements with foreign fum.s in order to gain
(or avoid losing) governmental customers. During the 1970s and
1980s, European governments demanded a greater role in the
development of the military aircraft they were buying from the
United States. A counterpart was the Japanese desire to build
up its aircraft manufacturing industry as exemplified in the controversial FSX fighter aircraft project involving a joint venture
between a Japanese manufacturer and a major U.S. aerospace
fum..
These demands for production (and often technology) sharing
intensified at a time when the United States government was eager to reduce the development costs of its weapon systems and
wished to encourage standardization, especially in NATO
weapons. In 1986, Congress reinforced this trend by enacting
legislation that encouraged multinational cooperation in
weapons development.
Another strategy adopted by foreign governments has been to
demand a greater role in the production of aircraft they were
purchasing from American companies. Faced with the prospect
that several European governments might try to develop an indigenous military fighter to rival the F -16, the General Dynamics
Corporation agreed to assign a major production role to domestic
5

Figure 1

Variations in U.S. Business Responses
to Global Markets in 1990
European Community
New Facilities (22%)

Asia
New Facilities {25%)
Acquisitions (28%)

Joint Ventures (47%)

Source: See Appendix, compiled from unpublished data made
available by the Conference Board, New York City.
frrms in prospective purchaser nations. This role included production of parts for aircraft sold to the U.S. Air Force. Aided by
such arrangements, and with the backing of leading Belgian and
Dutch aircraft frrms, General Dynamics won the contract over
strong competition. IS
In some circumstances, a host government may be willing to
accept the construction, expansion, or acquisition of a local
branch by an American company on the condition that the firm
meets a specified performance requirement or provides another
concession. Before IBM was allowed to increase its operations in
Mexico, the company agreed to set up a development center for
semiconductors, to purchase high-technology components from
6

Mexican companies, and to produce software for Latin America
in Mexico.l9
In the case of more standard manufactured goods, other ways
around investment barriers include entering into agreements
with local frrms who will produce the item under licensing arrangements. In some instances, frrms that would prefer to export products manufactured in their home countries are forced to
agree to license the manufacture to a company in the host country. While Japanese civilian markets are becoming more open to
foreign investment (IBM and Texas Instruments own production
facilities there), many companies must still rely on licensing and
other cooperative contractual relationships between the parent
and Japanese frrms. For example, U.S. companies, such as
Honeywell, RCA, and General Electric, have often been limited to
engaging in licensing arrangements in Japan.2o
Moreover, Japanese frrms have produced, under licensing
from American frrms, the McDonnell Douglas F-15 fighter aircraft, the Boeing Chinook helicopter, and the Lockheed P-3C aircraft. Similarly, companies in Taiwan have been licensed to
manufacture the M-109 howitzer, the FFG-7 class frigates, and
several missiles.21 At other times, a production-sharing arrangement is required. For example, a government-owned airline may require the manufacturer to buy designated amounts of
locally produced parts.
In the case of services, franchising to a domestic enterprise
serves a similar purpose to licensing in adjusting to barriers to
direct investment. However, governments may insist that the
domestic operator be given a majority control over the franchise
operations. For instance, South Korea generally discourages
franchising unless the local partner is given at least 50 percent
ownership. In addition, profits from the franchising business are
taxed at 40 percent, and a 10.75 percent withholding tax is
levied on royalties and dividends earned by the parent organization. Taiwan maintains similar restrictions but seldom allows
franchising agreements to extend beyond five years. Taiwan
also taxes dividends and royalties at 35 and 20 percent respectively.22

Responding to Other Governmental Barriers
In other parts of the world, especially in the less developed
nations, public-sector deterrents to business take different forms.
7

Governments on occasion restrict repatriation of earnings, or
foreign businesses fear future expropriation of their assets.
Governments may also restrict location, lmancing, and technology inputs, and require local sourcing of raw materials and rigid
technical specifications.2S

Uncertainty as to future public-sector policies
constitutes a major obstacle to investments
by foreign firms.

Indirect barriers, such as inadequate patent protection laws,
may also impede a firm's ability to market its products successfully in a foreign country. Marsh-McBirney reports that the
company has been especially hurt by the weakness of patent
protection overseas. In particular, company officials believe that
its export business in Europe would double if its patented products were adequately protected there.24 In such circumstances,
uncertainty as to future public-sector policies constitutes a major
obstacle to investments by foreign frrms.
At times, policy shifts occur in the host country. For example, until1985, Japanese electronics fums generally had been reluctant to make equity investments in China. Japanese exports
had met considerable success, assisted by concessionary lmancing provided by their government. Beijing's tightened control
over foreign exchange in 1986, however, resulted in a basic
change in the way in which the Japanese companies penetrated
the Chinese electronics market. The giants of the industry Matsushita, Hitachi, Sony, NEC, and Sanyo -all sharply increased their direct investments and joint ventures in the PRC.25
Global enterprises interested in doing business in parts of the
world characterized by great business uncertainty often set up
affiliate or correspondent relationships with local fums. This
minimizes risk and liability - and also profit potentials.
Consider the case of Exxon, whose Venezuela operations were
nationalized in 1975. Responding to a new political environment in that South American nation, the company has reopened
an office in Caracas to pursue proposals to build and operate energy facilities -with local partners under joint-venture agreements.
A combination of much lower wage rates and far less burdensome regulation has encouraged many Hong Kong companies to
8

relocate to Guangdong and other adjacent parts of mainland
China. Hong Kong has begun to enforce several tough anti-pollution laws; excessive industrial discharges into the air or the
harbor are punishable by substantial fines. The prospect of unification of Hong Kong and mainland China is, of course, another
important but immeasurable factor.
As a result, companies based in Hong Kong have invested approximately ten billion dollars in China and now reportedly control two-thirds of the twenty thousand factories that have been
built since 1980 in the adjacent area on the mainland. The
movement to the China mainland is very substantial. A decade
ago, Hong Kong had 3,200 toy factories. Almost all of such
manufacturing now takes place across the border.26
When other barriers have been imposed by governments in
the more advanced economies, licensing arrangements can be
made with domestic firms in exchange for market entry. These
governmental obstacles include local political or industrial pressures, local distribution systems strongly favoring home-produced products, and heavy transportation costs. Enterprises in
advanced economies can thus respond to attractive overseas
markets without directly penetrating them. Some U.S. workstation manufacturers have established licensing partnerships
with Japanese frrms desiring to enter the worldwide workstation
market in return for access to the lucrative Japanese portion of
the important computer market.
Companies that have difficulty introducing products in the
home country due to delayed approval or stricter governmental
requirements can license their products to lrrms in other countries in an effort to introduce them to markets more quickly.
This practice is common to some U.S. pharmaceutical frrms. For
example, Vestar and Genentech have on occasion introduced
drugs in Europe before they were approved in the United
States.27
A more fundamental response to burdensome domestic regulation is occurring in the U.S. petroleum industry. National policy keeps drilling rigs out of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge,
which the industry considers to be the country's best prospect
for new oil exploration. A recently enacted energy bill also extends moratoriums on offshore drilling and the new clean-air
rules make it more expensive and difficult to relme oil in the
United States.
As a result, U.S.-based energy companies have been expanding their overseas operations while cutting back their domestic
activities. The number of drilling rigs searching for oil and gas
9

in the United States has declined from 4,530 at the end of 1981
to 596 in mid-1992.
Total outlays for exploration and
development in the United States by 30 large oil and gas
companies fell 4 percent in 1991. Their investment abroad
increased by 27 percent and totaled more than 50 percent higher
than in domestic markets.

Faced with rising government burdens in one nation,
a firm can shift its high value-added activities
to other nations with lower taxes and
less burdensome regulation.

As recently as 1987, the domestic investment outlays of the
major U.S. energy companies exceeded their foreign expenditures. Thus, a major American industry is responding quietly
but effectively to onerous domestic regulation by putting its
growth overseas.28
In many other instances - especially in the more developed
nations - companies face high business taxes and onerous regulatory costs. In some cases, the barriers may be rather informal
in nature. When these barriers to business occur in the home
country, the enterprise can expand overseas. In more extreme
cases, existing business operations are moved to a more favorable policy environment in another country. In the case of informal barriers, such as in nations whose traditions favor established companies over newcomers, the response by the
transnational company often is to market through local
distributors.
It is helpful under changing political circumstances to do
business in several countries. In that event, when faced with rising government burdens in one nation, a frrm can shift its high
value-added activities to other nations in which it operates,
specifically those with lower taxes and less burdensome regulation.
Export restraints are usually imposed by governments attempting to punish another country by applying sanctions
against its trade. Compensating shifts often occur in the geographic distribution of goods from various exporting and importing nations. Companies in the target nation may supply or be
supplied by frrms in other nations, which are not adhering to the
sanctions; frrms in the sanctioning nation may wind up selling to
10

or buying from frrms that are the former customers of the nonsanctioning countries.
For example, during the 1980 U.S. grain embargo against the
Soviet Union, companies in Canada, Australia, Argentina, and
the European Community increased their wheat sales to the
Soviets. Companies in the United States in turn shifted wheat to
customers of these countries. Thus, the main impact of the embargo was to shift the international distribution of wheat sales,
with little effect on their total amount.29
It should be emphasized, however, that traditional business
reasons are also involved in the choice among the available
methods of penetrating foreign markets. Indeed, those business
concerns - such as cost and transportation advantages - may
often be the dominating influence.

The Feedback on Government Policy
In the years ahead, the combined power of economic incentives and technological change will increasingly have feedback
effects on the decisions of voters and government officials as
they develop new national (and regional) policies dealing with
the global economy. In a basic sense, the mobility of enterprises
- of their people, capital, and information - is reducing the
power of government. Public-sector decision makers increasingly are being forced to understand that they no"?' have to become internationally competitive in the economic policies they
devise. Governmental activities that impose costs without compensating benefits or that reduce wealth substantially in the process of redistributing income undermine the competitive positions of domestic enterprises. The result is either the loss of
business to frrms located in other nations or the movement of
the domestic company's resources and operations to more hospitable locations.
Political scientists and economists have long understood that
people vote with their feet. They leave localities, regions, and
nations with limited opportunity in favor of those that offer a
more attractive future. In this era of computers, telephones, and
fax machines, enterprises are far more mobile than that; information - that key resource - can be transferred in a matter of
seconds, or less. The fear of losing economic activity to other
parts of the world can be expected to reshape future domestic political agendas in fundamental ways.
11

Of course, not all governmental involvement in international
business is of a negative nature. On many occasions, public-sector policies actively encourage foreign companies to invest, to
build new facilities or otherwise to participate in the local economy. Such supportive actions include tax abatements, tariff
waivers, liberal credit terms, and reductions in burdensome regulation. For instance, as an incentive to invest in Hungary, the
Hungarian government offered Ford Motor Company a 10-year
freeze on the payment of taxes.80

In a global economy, governmental barriers
become far from absolute.
Moreover - and often of transcending importance -business
enterprises simultaneously take into account a great variety of
traditional business considerations. These range from differences in production and distribution costs to the limits of the
firms' own fmancial and organizational capabilities. In the move
toward globalization, individual firms may experience rough
sledding and reverse some of their foreign commitments.
The alliance between General Motors and Daewoo of South
Korea went sour when Daewoo's desire to expand in local markets conflicted with GM's global objectives.81 Greater difficulties
have arisen in the transitional economies of Eastern Europe and
the republics of the former Soviet Union. Often investors do not
know if they have legal title to the items they purchase. As a result, of the 2,000 deals Americans have made in Russia and the
other republics, less than 100 are functioning.
In late 1981, Metallgesellschaft AG, the large German metallurgy fli'IIl, pulled out of its 60 percent stake in a steel plant in
Hungary. The German company said that the Hungarian government partners wanted it to foot a larger portion of the operating costs than its contract provided for. According to Peter
Giesler, an official of Metallgesellschaft, "We learned that contracts which were made at the time were not enforceable at another time."
The American fli'IIl United Technologies reports a similar experience. In 1991, it signed a contract to sell jet engines to
Malev, the Hungarian national airline. The document contained
a clause stating that it was legally binding. However, Malev
called it merely a "letter of intent" and subsequently announced
that it would purchase the engines from General Electric.
12

Although the American fli'IIl won when it sued in a Hungarian
court, the case is now on appeal. 82
In more developed markets, DuPont and Holland's Philips
ended a cooperative agreement because of different goals. So did
Borden, Inc. and Japan's Meiji Milk Products. Earlier, Bull of
France, Siemens of Germany, and Philips abandoned their attempt to form a Europe-based computer alliance. 88 Clearly, the
interaction of regionalization and globalization will continue to
generate winners and losers.
Even if many of the public-sector barriers remain, the privatesector will increasingly learn how to overcome them or even just
to live with them. Of course, there are costs involved when
businesses respond to governmental barriers to international
business. However, in a global economy, these barriers become
far from absolute.

Conclusion
The tension between business and government is nothing
new. It has traditionally existed between large private enterprises and the rulers of developing countries (see Table 1). This
tension between governments generally (both those with developing and those with more advanced economies) and the business fliTil is being exacerbated by the rapid rate of economic, social, and technological change.
Companies oriented to the global marketplace, in turn, have a
variety of response mechanisms to draw upon. These range
from exporting to acquiring other fli'IIls to licensing products and
services, and to entering into strategic alliances with other business fliTils. As we have seen, those choices are often strongly influenced by governmental policies and practices. These publicsector influences include actions by the nation in which the parent company is located as well as by the country in which the
fliTil is trying to develop a new presence. The governmental actions range from the supportive, such as a tax incentive to invest
in a specific region, to overt barriers, notably restrictions on imports and foreign investment.
Fortunately, there is another force involved that ultimately is
likely to carry the day- the citizen as consumer. Consumers
vote every day of the week - in dollars, yen, Deutsche marks,
pounds, francs, and lira. The same protectionist-oriented voters,
as consumers, purchase products made everywhere in the world.
They give far greater weight in spending their own money to
13

Table 1
Tensions Between Developing-Country Goals
and Business Activities
Developing Countries

International Private Enterprises

Promote local ownership

Maintain global standards and
efficiency

Increase local control

Minimize cost and complexity of
delivering technology and capital

Change payment
characteristics and reduce
duration of contracts

Receive just returns for risks

Minimize source firm's control
over use of technology and
capital in user nation

Gain assurance regarding property
rights over use of private resources

Separate technology from
normal private investments

Provide technology as part of longterm production and market
development

Remove restrictive business
clauses in investment and
technology agreements

Maintain ability to affect the use of
capital, technology and associated
products

Minimize proprietary rights of
suppliers

Protect right to profit from private
investments

Reduce contract security

Use contracts to create an
environment of stability and trust

Encourage transfer of R&D to
host country

Maintain control of R&D paid for by
company

Develop products suitable for
domestic markets

Gain global economies of scale to
lower cost of products to consumers

Source:

price and quality than country of origin. And they increasingly
travel to, and communicate with, people in virtually every land.
Consequently, businesses will continue to adopt innovative and
effective responses not only to the barriers governments may
erect, but also to the potential to turn a profit in a global
economy.

Adapted from the President's Task Force on International Private
Enterprise, The Prl.vate Enterprf.se Guldebook (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1984).
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Appendix

U.S. Business Investment Overseas, 1988-1990
This appendix contains detailed data on direct investments by
U.S. manufacturing companies in overseas markets during the
period 1988-1990, as provided by the Conference Board.l The
tables which follow indicate the specific types of investments by
U.S. manufacturers. The Conference Board collected the data
from business publications and announcements of planned U.S.
manufacturing operations abroad. The data is limited to firms
with combined domestic and foreign sales of $1 million or more
annually; thus, the tables cover medium-to-large-size companies.
The types of manufacturing operations recorded include joint
ventures with and acquisitions of foreign companies, as well as
expansions of existing production facilities or construction of
new plants. Also included is information regarding the country
in which the investment is made, the amount, in dollars, of the
overseas investment, and the type of product that will be manufactured. The data set was supplemented with information regarding the size of the U.S. parent firm and the specific industry
in which the manufacturing operations will take place.
Table A.1 presents a breakdown of investment by type of industry, following the two-digit SIC (Standard Industrial
Classification) codes. Chemicals (SIC 28) and electronic and
electrical equipment and components (SIC 36 and 38) represent
the most important industries in terms of the number of overseas operations in which U.S. fums engaged during the years
1988-1990.
Overall, acquisitions appear to be the preferred method of
conducting manufacturing operations abroad, accounting for
more than half of the total. However, this pattern does not hold
up over all geographic areas. As suggested by Table A.2, acquisitions are usually used in the European Community and in
Canada. Joint ventures, on the other hand, are most important
in Asia. As demonstrated in the body of this paper, this is likely
due to the fact that investment restrictions by Asian rim nations
make joint ventures and other strategic alliances the most feasible method of operating in those countries.
lFor more detail, see Harvey S. James, Jr., Patterns of
Economic Globalization: The Case of U.S. Manufacturers,
1988-1990 (St. Louis: Washington University, Center for the
Study of American Business, forthcoming).
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Tables A.3, A.4, and A.5 give details on the number of fmns
for the entire sample, the European Community and Asia that
utilize acquisitions, joint ventures, and new plants or expansions
abroad, respectively, for all manufacturing industries.
Figures A.1, A.2, and A.3 indicate the influence of technology
on activities of manufacturing enterprises. High-technology industries are those in which R&D represent a significant percentage of total sales. In the figures presented here, high-technology
industries are coded from the following two-digit SIC areas: 28
chemicals, 35 machinery and computers, 36 electronic equipment and components, 37 transportation equipment, and 38 analytical instruments. While joint ventures continue to be the
dominant way in which U.S. manufacturers operate in Asia, they
are relatively less important in the case of low-technology products. Similarly, while acquisitions are the main way that
American manufacturing firms establish an operating presence
in Western Europe, joint ventures are relied on most heavily in
the case of high technology companies.
In Tables A.6 and A.7, the size of the U.S. fliiil is presented
relative to the geographic area in which the company invests
abroad and the type of investment activity the fum engages in.
The size of companies is determined by annual domestic and
foreign sales in 1991, and is 'taken from the Lotus Development
Corporation CD/ROM data base.2 The average flTIIl had combined domestic and foreign sales of $13.9 billion. The sales of
firms ranged from a low of $1 million to a high of $119.8 billion.
The size of flTIIls for the tables and figures presented here is
coded as follows: small firms are companies with annual sales of
less than $100 million; medium-size fums have sales between
$100 million and $1 billion; mediurnllarge companies have annual sales of $1-10 billion; large companies have sales of $10-50
billion; companies with sales exceeding $50 billion are coded as
very large.
Figures A.4 and A.5 depict the pattern of investment activities
in Asia and the European Community by the size of the firm.
The differences in scale facilitate comparison between Asia and
Europe.
2 Lotus

One Source, Release 3.1, CD/Corporate: U.S. Public
Companies (Cambridge, MA: Lotus Development Corp., 1991).
Annual sales of companies not listed in the CD data base sample
were obtained from Million Dollar Directory: America's Leading
Public and Private Companies (Parsippany, NJ: Dun & Bradstreet,
1992.) Firms with no sales data available were excluded.
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Table A.l

Table A.2

Number of U.S. Manufacturing Investment
Activities Abroad, by Industry,
1988-1990

Number of U.S. Manufacturing Investment
Activities, by Area, 1988-1990

Type of Investment
Tvoe of Investment
Acquisitions

Joint
Ventures

New
plants/
Expansions

Total

221

63

67

351

Asia

31

76

30

137

Canada

65

5

9

79

Acquisitions

Joint
Ventures

New
plants/
Expansions

Total

Chemicals

52

37

37

126

Electric/
electronic equip.

55

43

22

120

Machinery

53

22

11

86

Latin America

10

14

10

34

Transportation
equip.

23

25

7

55

Other Europe

27

37

_a

67

354

195

119

668

4

5

1

10

Metals

21

13

9

43

Wood/paper
products

33

9

9

51

Food products

54

12

8

74

8

4

2

14

Industry

Target Area
European Community

Petroleum

Textiles

Total

Other
manufacturing

M

25

..ll

..89

Total

354

195

119

668

Source: Same as Table A.l.

Source: Compiled from unpublished worksheets supplied

by the Conference Board.
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Table A.3

Table A.4

Number of U.S. Firms Making Acquisitions,
by Industry, 1988-1990

Number of U.S. Firms Engaged in Joint Ventures,
by Industry, 1988-1990

European
Industry

~Qmmunitt

Asia

Latin
America

European
Industry

Latin

~Qmmunitt

Asia

Am~ri~a

Chemicals

27

3

2

Chemicals

14

13

3

Electric/electronic
equipment

36

5

2

Electric/electronic
equipment

14

20

3

Machinery

37

4

0

Machinery

9

10

0

Transportation
equipment

17

3

1

Transportation
equipment

8

9

2

2

1

0

Petroleum

1

2

0

Metals

14

0

0

Metals

4

4

2

Wood/paper
products

21

2

1

Wood/paper
products

4

0

0

Food

31

4

4

Food products

3

6

0

6

2

0

Textiles

1

1

1

Other

~

z

Q

Other
manufacturing

_Q

_a

221

31

10

il

Total

Total

63

76

14

Petroleum

Textiles

Source: Same as Table A.1.
Source: Same as Table A.1
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Table A.S

Table A.6

Number of Firms Building New Plants
or Expanding Existing Facilities,
by Industry, 1988-1990

U.S. Manufacturing Investment Abroad,
by Size of Firm, Geographic Area, 1988-1990

European
~Qmmuni~

~

Latin
Ameri!;il

All
Others
No.
%

Size

European
Community
No.
%

Asia
No.
%

Small

17

40.5

5

11.9

3

7.1

17

40.5

42

Medium

63

54.3

18

15.5

5

4.3

30

25.9

116

162

54.6

55

18.5

15

5.1

65

21.9

297

70

49.7

43

30.5

6

4.3

22

15.6

141

Latin

America
No.
%

Chemicals

21

9

3

Electric/electronic
equipment

13

7

2

8

1

2

Transportation
equipment

7

0

0

Petroleum

1

0

0

Metals

5

1

0

Table A.7

Wood/paper
products

2

3

1

Types of U.S. Manufacturing Investment Abroad,
by Size of Firm and Type of Investment, 1988-1990

Food products

3

3

0

Machinery

Textiles
Other
manufacturing
Total

Medium/Large
Large

Total
No.

Very Large

M

55.4

..ll

23.1

_Q.

8.9

.:z

12.5

56

Total

343

52.6

134

20.6

34

5.2

141

21.6

652

Source: Same as Table A.1

2

0

0

.Q

_§

..2

67

30

10

Size

Joint
Ventures
No.
%

Total
No.

2.2

52..4

15

35.7

5

11.9

42.

Medium

77

66.4

27

23.3

12

10.3

116

172

57.9

75

25.3

50

16.8

297

55

39.0

53

37.6

33

23.4

141

Very Large

...lQ

2.6.8

24

42.9

l1

30.4

56

Total

341

52..3

194

29.8

117

17.9

652

Medium/Large

Source: Same as Table A.1
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New plants/
Expansions
No.
%

Small

Large

Source: Same as Table A.1

Acquisitions
No.
%
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Figure A.l

Figure A.3

Proportion of U.S. Manufacturing Investment
Abroad in Acquisitions, by Area, 1988-1990

Proportion of U.S. Investment in New/Expanded
Facilities, by Area, 1988-1990
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Figure A.2

Figure A.4

Proportion of U.S. Investment in Joint Ventures,
by Area, 1988-1990

U.S. Manufacturing Investment in the
European Community, by Size of Firm, 1988-1990
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Figure A.S

U.S. Manufacturing Investment in Asia,
by Size of Firm, 1988-1990
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